A Michigan lender holds a judgment of nearly $14 million against a developer whose project failed. It can see a house in Birmingham, the vacant lot next door and a property in Aspen. It learns that each is held inside a Delaware company owned mostly by a trust he created in 2007.
So it asks the Delaware Court of Chancery to call the trust a sham. In matters like this the firm usually finds the outcome was fixed years earlier, by how the trust was drafted and what it was allowed to own.
Key takeaways
- On May 2, 2025, a Senior Magistrate in Chancery found that the trust met the Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act. The magistrate recommended dismissal of the creditor’s sham petition at the pleading stage.
- The trust held 90 percent membership interests in three Delaware LLCs, never the real estate; a member has no interest in specific company property.
- The settlor’s investment advisor role and his brother’s trust protector role were powers the Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act lets a transferor keep.
- The same lender won in Michigan. On July 17, 2026 the Court of Appeals affirmed an order voiding a January 2020 deed from the settlor to one of the LLCs as constructively fraudulent.
- The trust was funded in 2007, seven years before the loan, outside every limitations period a creditor or a bankruptcy trustee could invoke.
The loan, the judgment, the trust
In October 2014, Can IV Packard Square, LLC lent nearly $54 million to Craig Schubiner’s company for a retail and residential project in Ann Arbor, on his guaranty. The project stalled, the lender foreclosed, and on December 17, 2019, the Oakland County Circuit Court entered judgment against him for $13,992,936.05 plus fees, interest and costs. On January 16, 2020, it enjoined him from transferring assets outside the normal course of business [1].
Since the injunction Schubiner has maintained that he has no personal assets to satisfy the judgment [2]. What he has is a trust, created by agreement dated April 30, 2007, with U.S. Trust Company of Delaware as its first trustee.
Its assets were 90 percent membership interests in three Delaware limited liability companies, 304, 305 and 306 Associates LLC. Two South Dakota trusts held the other 10 percent, and Schubiner managed each company.
305 Associates owned the Birmingham house at 200 Aspen Road, his residence from 2001 to 2018, and the vacant lot at 201 Linden Road. 306 Associates owned property on East Hyman Avenue in Aspen, Colorado [2].
After years of collection efforts, the lender filed in Delaware on September 11, 2023, asking the Court of Chancery to void the spendthrift clause or invalidate the trust altogether. It amended the petition a month later. The settlor and the beneficiaries moved to dismiss, and the trustee answered, confirmed it continues to serve and denied that the trust is a sham [2].
2007Trust funded, seven years before the loan
$13.99MMichigan guaranty judgment, December 17, 2019
90%Trust’s membership interest in each of three Delaware LLCs
$1.5MMortgage the settlor signed personally in January 2020
Sources: Mich. Ct. App., Schubiner v. Can IV Packard Square, LLC [1]; Del. Ch., Senior Magistrate’s Final Report, In the Matter of the CES 2007 Trust [2]
The creditor’s sham theory
The petition’s theory was control. Schubiner directed the trustee on investments as the trust’s Advisor, with full power to manage the investments in a fiduciary capacity. His brother, as Trust Protector, could remove the trustee and appoint a successor.
Schubiner managed the companies and had moved the Birmingham house in and out of 305 Associates for years. In May 2017 the first trustee had petitioned the court to resign and to be paid its past-due fees, alleging that Schubiner and his brother had ignored its requests. It withdrew the petition that August once a successor, First State Trust Company, was in place.
From this the lender asked the court to infer that Schubiner was the trustee in fact. It also asked the court to infer that the trustees were never meant to take part in administering the trust, and that the trust was a shell [2].
This is the standard attack on a domestic asset protection trust, and it is not frivolous. The question is whether the pleaded facts show a settlor operating the trust as his own account, or only using powers the statute lets him keep.
Membership interests are not real estate
The magistrate’s first move was to separate the trust from the properties. Every transfer the lender complained of ran between Schubiner and his companies, none to or from the trust.
Under the Delaware LLC Act, a limited liability company interest is personal property, and “A member has no interest in specific limited liability company property” [3]. The trust owned membership interests; it never owned a house or a lot, so there was no transfer to the trust for a fraudulent transfer claim to attach to. The lender, the report said, had “pled no basis on which this Court should engage in veil piercing” [2].
The entity layer between a trust and the assets it funds is not decoration. It fixes what the trust owns and keeps the settlor’s later dealings with the underlying property from being charged to the trust.
It does nothing to protect that property from the settlor’s own transfers of it. That is where Michigan comes in.
The retained powers the Act allows
Delaware’s Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, 12 Del. C. §§ 3570 to 3576, has permitted self-settled asset protection trusts since 1997 [2].
A qualified disposition needs a qualified trustee: a Delaware resident other than the transferor, or a regulated Delaware trust company. The trustee must keep custody of some trust property in Delaware, keep the records, prepare the fiduciary returns or otherwise materially participate in administration.
The Act then lists what the transferor may keep without the trust being treated as revocable. The list includes a veto over distributions, the right to remove a trustee or advisor and appoint a new one, and the receipt of income and discretionary principal [4].
The magistrate found both corporate trustees qualified. The petition did not allege that either had failed to keep custody, records or tax filings.
A trustee can be quiet when the only assets are LLC interests managed at the company level. The advisor and protector roles were within the Act [2].
The lender’s fallback was the common law. Section 3536(a) exposes a beneficiary’s interest to creditors only as the trust instrument or “the laws of this State” provide [5].
Kulp v. Timmons, 944 A.2d 1023 (Del. Ch. 2002), lets a court disregard a self-settled spendthrift trust with no economic reality. That can happen on public policy, where the settlor keeps control and enjoyment as before, or by merger, where the settlor’s and the beneficiaries’ interests are identical [6].
Neither fit. A qualified trustee held the interests, with sole and absolute discretion over distributions, for beneficiaries defined as Schubiner’s wife, if any, his parents and his issue [2]. The report recommended dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Control arguments succeed when the settlor holds a power the statute does not name, or when the trustee’s file is empty. They fail when the drafting follows § 3570 and the trustee can show it administered the trust.
What the report settles, and what it leaves open
The report is a Senior Magistrate’s final report; it recommends dismissal rather than entering judgment, and exceptions to it may be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144 [2]. It also stops short of the property.
The magistrate declined to “adjudge the real estate transactions at the LLC level under the guise of potential fraudulent transfer.” Whatever the companies did with their parcels, the trust’s membership interests did not change [2].
For planners the holding is narrower than a merits blessing and more useful. A creditor of the settlor who cannot point to a transfer into the trust or a distribution out of it does not get past the pleadings on a sham theory. That holds so long as a qualified trustee holds the interests and the settlor’s powers are ones the Act names.
What the report does not settle is the fate of the parcels themselves. That question the lender took to Michigan.
Michigan voided what Delaware would not
Meanwhile the lender was winning in Oakland County. On January 16, 2020, the day the injunction issued, Schubiner quitclaimed the Birmingham house and the Linden lot from 305 Associates to himself. He signed a $1.5 million mortgage note on the house in his own name and used the proceeds to retire the existing loans on both parcels.
On January 20, 2020, he deeded both back to 305 Associates for $1. He testified that one reason he had created 305 was to keep assets from creditors, though none existed then [1].
On March 14, 2025, after an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial court held the January 20 deed a fraudulent transfer under Michigan’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and voided it. On July 17, 2026, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion.
The claim rested on MCL 566.35(1), constructive fraud: a pre-existing creditor, an insolvent debtor, and no reasonably equivalent value. No proof of intent is needed.
Schubiner did not contest insolvency on appeal; with the $14 million judgment his debts “grossly exceeded his net worth.” On value, before the refinancing 305 was the primary obligor and Schubiner the guarantor. Afterward “305’s obligation was erased, with Schubiner becoming the primary (and only) obligor,” and 305 gave him nothing for it [1].
| Ruling | What was attacked | Rule applied | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Del. Ch., Senior Magistrate, May 2, 2025 | The trust and its spendthrift clause | 12 Del. C. §§ 3570-3576; LLC Act § 18-701; Kulp v. Timmons | Dismissal recommended: qualified trustee, permitted powers, no transfer touching the trust |
| Oakland County Circuit Court, Mar. 14, 2025 | The January 20, 2020 deed to 305 Associates | MCL 566.35(1), constructive fraud | Deed voided: insolvent debtor, no reasonably equivalent value |
| Mich. Ct. App., July 17, 2026 (published) | The March 2025 order | Clear-error review of the UVTA findings | Affirmed |
Result: the trust kept its membership interests; the company under it lost the deed it took back in 2020.
The two courts were not in conflict. Delaware found no transfer touching the trust. Michigan found a transfer between the settlor and his LLC by an insolvent debtor for no value.
The lesson: after a judgment, do not move property in and out of the structure, and do not sign the company’s debt in your own name. Each is a transfer a creditor can test without proving intent.
What the drafting got right
1
An institutional Delaware trustee.
U.S. Trust Company of Delaware, then First State Trust Company. Each met § 3570, and the petition could not say otherwise.
2
Powers kept inside the statute.
The settlor could not be trustee, directed investments as Advisor, and left distributions to the trustee’s sole discretion. The brother’s removal power is one the Act names.
3
Entities between trust and property.
The trust owned membership interests, which the LLC Act makes personal property. The real estate never entered the trust, so nothing done with it was a transfer to or from the trust.
4
Funded before the debt existed.
The 2007 disposition preceded the 2014 loan by seven years. A later creditor has four years and must prove actual intent by clear and convincing evidence.
The window closed before the loan
Under § 3572, a creditor’s only path against a qualified disposition is Delaware’s fraudulent transfer statute, in the Court of Chancery, by clear and convincing evidence. A creditor whose claim arose after the disposition must sue within four years of it and show actual intent to defraud that creditor.
A pre-existing creditor has the period in 6 Del. C. § 1309: four years, or for actual intent one year after the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered. Spouses and children owed support or a divorce division, and victims of pre-transfer torts, are carved out to the extent of the debt [4] [7].
In bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 548(e) covers a transfer to a self-settled trust made within ten years of the petition. It applies if the debtor is a beneficiary and acted with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud [8]. The 2007 funding sat outside all of it: twelve years before the judgment, and outside the ten-year window even if Schubiner had filed.
The comparison cases agree. In Klabacka v. Nelson (Nev. 2017) the Nevada Supreme Court vacated alimony and child support awards in part.
The awards were vacated to the extent they ran against the husband’s self-settled spendthrift trust rather than against him personally [9]. In TrustCo Bank v. Mathews (Del. Ch. 2015) fraudulent transfer claims against three Delaware trusts settled in 2006 were held time barred under the four-year and one-year-from-notice limits [10].
Both were resolved in the trust state’s own courts, and TrustCo turned on timing. In re Huber, a 2013 bankruptcy ruling from the Western District of Washington, went the other way. A Tacoma developer’s Alaska trust, set up in haste in 2008, was judged under Washington law despite its Alaska governing-law clause.
The transfers into it were voided under Washington’s fraudulent transfer statute [11]. The trust that survives is funded early, by a settlor who keeps only statutory powers, and litigated at home.
How Dilendorf Law Firm helps
Dilendorf Law Firm, based in Manhattan’s Financial District, represents individuals, families and businesses in asset protection and trust matters nationwide.
For clients forming a domestic asset protection trust, we draft to the chosen state’s statute and select an institutional trustee. We place real estate and operating assets in entities beneath the trust, and document the settlor’s advisor and protector roles so that each power held is one the Act names.
For clients whose trust is under attack, we review the trust file against the creditor’s theory and assess exposure under the fraudulent transfer and bankruptcy limitation periods. We coordinate with counsel in the trust state and the judgment state. We also advise trustees and protectors on resignations and successor appointments.
Send us:
- The trust agreement, with every amendment and any trustee acceptance or resignation
- A schedule of what the trust owns, including entity operating agreements and ownership percentages
- Deeds, notes and financing statements for any property moved in or out since the trust was funded
- Any judgment, injunction or demand letter a creditor has served
We respond with a written assessment within 48 hours. Paid consultations only.
Frequently asked questions
Did the Delaware court rule that the CES 2007 Trust is valid?
Not in a final judgment: the Senior Magistrate’s final report found the trust met the Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act and recommended dismissal of the petition at the pleading stage. Exceptions to such a report may be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144. In practice the sham petition did not get past the pleadings and the trust’s membership interests were never touched.
Can a settlor manage the LLCs a Delaware asset protection trust owns?
The Act does not spell it out, and the magistrate said it did not need to. The settlor managed all three companies and the trust owned only membership interests, not real estate; the LLC Act, not the settlor, defines what the trust holds as a member. Treat it as a tolerated fact pattern, not a safe harbor, and keep the trustee informed and documented.
Why did the same creditor win in Michigan?
Because it attacked a different transfer. Michigan voided a January 2020 deed from the settlor to 305 Associates under constructive fraud: he was insolvent after a $14 million judgment and received no reasonably equivalent value. That deed ran between the settlor and his company, not the trust, so Delaware’s view of the trust did not protect it.
Sources
[1] Michigan Court of Appeals, Schubiner v. Can IV Packard Square, LLC, Nos. 371134 and 377133, published opinion (July 17, 2026). https://www.courts.michigan.gov/4a8567/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/opinions/final/coa/20260717_c371134_74_371134.opn.pdf
[2] Delaware Court of Chancery, In the Matter of the CES 2007 Trust, C.A. No. 2023-0925-SEM, Senior Magistrate’s Final Report, Molina, S.M. (May 2, 2025). https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=378960
[3] Delaware Code, Title 6, Chapter 18, Subchapter VII, § 18-701 (Limited Liability Company Act: nature of interest). https://delcode.delaware.gov/title6/c018/sc07/index.html
[4] Delaware Code, Title 12, Chapter 35, Subchapter VI, §§ 3570-3576 (Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act). https://delcode.delaware.gov/title12/c035/sc06/index.html
[5] Delaware Code, Title 12, Chapter 35, Subchapter III, § 3536 (Rights of creditors and assignees of beneficiary of trust). https://delcode.delaware.gov/title12/c035/sc03/index.html
[6] Delaware Court of Chancery, Kulp v. Timmons, 944 A.2d 1023, C.A. No. 1946-S, Jacobs, V.C. (July 30, 2002), CourtListener. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1941734/kulp-v-timmons/
[7] Delaware Code, Title 6, Chapter 13 (Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), §§ 1304 and 1309. https://delcode.delaware.gov/title6/c013/index.html
[8] 11 U.S.C. § 548, Fraudulent transfers and obligations, Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/548
[9] Nevada Supreme Court, Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 24, No. 66772 (May 25, 2017), CourtListener. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4634528/klabacka-vs-nelson-cw-66772/
[10] Delaware Court of Chancery, TrustCo Bank v. Mathews, C.A. No. 8374-VCP, Parsons, V.C. (January 22, 2015), CourtListener. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2772407/trustco-bank/
[11] U.S. Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Washington, Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, Adv. No. 12-04171 (May 17, 2013), CourtListener. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8523523/waldron-v-huber-in-re-huber/
This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Outcomes depend on the facts of each matter and no result is guaranteed. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Dilendorf Law Firm. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Attorney Advertising.

